

ING2 report

Proposal for compromise amendments - version (24/04/2023) - clean

EU coordinated strategy against foreign interference

CA 1 EPP (269, 271, 273), S&D (276), RE (272), Greens (277)

1. Underlines that the *Russia's war of aggression against (269, 272, 277) Ukraine* made the link even more evident between attempts of foreign manipulation of the information and threats to the EU *and its immediate neighbourhood, Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries (276)*, as well as to the global security and stability; *notes that Russia's full-scale war in Ukraine made the effects of Russia' interference (271) in democratic processes even more obvious, that began long before the invasion (273), and is based on historical revisionism (272)*;

CA 2 EPP (282, 290), S&D (268, 846), RE (280, 283, 913, 915), Greens (286), NI (855)

2. Takes notes of the follow-up of the Commission to the first recommendations adopted by the European Parliament on 9 March 2022; reiterates however its call for an EU coordinated strategy against foreign interference *taking into account both the complexity and the multi-dimensional nature of the threats based on an articulated and multipolar geo-political analysis (268)*; *is of the opinion that this whole-of-society strategy (855) should include measures to enforce better existing provisions on (286) foreign interference, a focal point for investigation and strategic responses to counter foreign interference (280), and secured funding for capacity-building activities to tackle disinformation and uphold democratic processes (290, 846)*; *believes this strategy should bring together and create synergies between the detached efforts, strategies, action plans, roadmaps and underlying projects and funding streams; believes it should establish the strategic goals, required mandates and operational capabilities, such as threat information sharing and technical attribution, the legislative and diplomatic tools, such as new legislation, norms, toolboxes, political attribution, sanctions, and other countermeasures, and the capacity-building requirements, such as additional funding of EU agencies and civil society organizations that contribute to this these efforts with key performance indicators to ensure that sufficient scale and reach of results is obtained (280)*;

2a (new) Welcomes in this regard the announcement by the President of the Commission of a Defence of Democracy package *recalls the Commission's statements to carefully take into account INGE and ING2 committee recommendations to develop a robust Defence of Democracy Package (282) and legislation to counter hybrid threats in the EU (283, 913, 915)*;

CA 3 EPP (291), Greens (292), ECR (322), Left (289)

3. *Calls on the Commission and the member States (289) to ensure that all measures taken to protect the EU against foreign interference and information manipulation need to include strong and resolute safeguards to fundamental rights, including the freedom of expression and the freedom of opinions (291, 322)*;

CA 4 S&D (294, 296), RE (293, 295, 297)

4. Is of the opinion that efforts to move from a country-agnostic approach *that treats all foreign influence efforts in the same way, regardless of their source country, towards a risk-based* approach based on objective criteria should be *highly* (297) considered, similarly to the Directive 2015/849⁹, *and drawing lessons learned from other countries; it would function as one of the building blocks of a tiered approach that informs policies and countermeasures against foreign interference, lowers unnecessary legal complexity, and uses the limited capabilities and resources, from operational to policy level, more efficiently by taking into consideration the very factor that matters most in evaluating and responding to foreign influence: its source country; [this approach should include] a clear set of potential sanctions (296), [and therefore] function[s] as a form of deterrence towards transgressors and as leverage towards emerging malicious actors that could be added to the list; believes potential criteria could include: (a) engagement in activities of foreign interference, (b) an Intellectual Property theft program directed against the Union and its member states, (c) legislation that forces national non-state actors to participate in intelligence activities, (d) consistent violation of human rights, (e) revisionist policy towards the existing international legal order, (f) enforcement of authoritarian ideology extraterritorially (293, 295); calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to present specific recommendations for introduction of this approach and direct them to the Council for approval (294);*

CA 5 RE (301, 303), ECR (304)

5. Considers that the EU, *in collaboration with the Member States (304)* should step up its strategic communication on *countering and debunking (303)*, information manipulations by widely reporting ongoing operations as they happen (de-bunking), in particular in the Global South; calls for strengthening of and further investment in EU pre-bunking capabilities; *recalls the examples set by Ukraine and Taiwan in pre- and de-bunking information manipulations and the need to build on the lessons-learned from their experience; recalls similarly that in order to pre-bunk or rapidly de-bunk information manipulations, a framework should allow for rapid sharing of information provided by civil society and private companies (301);*

CA 6 S&D (315), RE (319), Greens (313), ECR (316)

6. Calls for the establishment of an EU structure tasked with analysing statistical data, coordinating research projects and producing reports to increase situational awareness (313) *and threat intelligence sharing, attribution and countermeasures (319)* on foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) *including in the EU's external action (313)*, and which serves as a reference point *and specialised knowledge hub (313)* to facilitate and foster *operational* exchange between Member States' authorities, *EU institutions (313), and EU agencies (319)*; considers that this structure should [be financed from the EU budget] and take the form of a Centre for Information Integrity that collaborates with all EU institutions *in using all available tools to avoid duplications (315, 316);*

CA 7 EPP (320), RE (321)

6a. ***Calls on the Member States to acknowledge the fact that foreign interference, including disinformation, is a national and cross-border security threat (321); stresses the need for solidarity between the Member States so that such activities can be effectively combated; calls for Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to be amended to include foreign interference (320);***

CA 8 RE (325, 332), Greens (327), Left (326)

9. Encourages all types of cooperation between the services of the different EU Institutions in charge of operational activities concerning monitoring and counteracting disinformation, such as the one existing between the ***EP task force on Disinformation (327)***, Commission services and the European External Action Service (EEAS) StratCom division with its Rapid Alert System; ***welcomes the EEAS and Commission's engagement with Parliament to regularly update on significant developments in the FIMI threat landscape, especially when it concerns EU elections (326, 332); suggest the establishment of a Rapid Alert System for Members of the European Parliament and members of national parliaments to counter disinformation on online platforms and prevent sharing of disinformation (325);***

CA 9 EPP (314), RE (328, 845)

9 a. ***[Welcomes the facilitation by the EEAS] of a Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) that would develop a common methodology and framework to collect and share systematic threat intelligence and evidence (328) and ultimately provide better situational awareness (845 [points out the progress made by the EEAS on a common analytical framework and methodology on FIMI as described in the EDAP and] underlines how such an open-source, collaborative and interoperable protocol as part of the ISAC [to support situational awareness] can contribute to closer collaboration among EUIBAs, Member States, social media platforms, news agencies, and civil society actors (328); calls for sufficient funding to be directed towards the continuous development, socialization, and capacity building that contributes to the wide adoption of this model with significant reach and scale across the Union; (314)***

Resilience

CA 10 EPP (339, 341, 343), Greens (340), ECR (342)

10. Calls for a collective effort ***by the EU institutions, Member States, partner countries, civil society, the business world and independent media in particular (339, 342) to raise social and institutional (343) awareness and invest in education (342) about disinformation, information manipulation and (341) foreign interference and how to counteract it, in a holistic way (340);***

CA 11 EPP (348, 349), RE (347)

11. Underlines that the EU must learn lessons from ***Ukraine's, Taiwan's and other countries', (347, 348, 349) experience and expertise in countering foreign interference and aggression and continue close cooperation with such countries***

Ukraine (349) in this field; *notes however the different context in which Taiwan operates; (347)*

CA 12 EPP (354), RE (357)

12. Welcomes the fact that the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), an independent network for fact-checkers, academic researchers and other stakeholders, will soon have hubs covering all EU Member States, thus reinforcing its mission in detecting and analysing disinformation campaigns, *false information and other content created by third countries with clear propagandistic intent, and (354)* organising media literacy activities and other activities supporting the fight against disinformation; *emphasizes the potential need for a legal framework in the EU or Member States to ensure quality fact-checking; (357)*

CA 13 EPP (360, 361, 362, 366), S&D (359), RE (363, 365), Greens (367)

13. Reiterates its call for Member States to include media and digital literacy, civic education, *common European history (366)*, respect for fundamental rights, critical thinking and promotion of public participation on school and university curricula, in parallel with *general (367)* efforts to raise awareness among adults, *including the elderly (362)*, and *efforts to bridge the age, gender and socioeconomic digital gap (359)*; *calls for a concerted EU media literacy strategy with projects that create tangible results of significant scale and that reach the whole Union (363)*; *encourages the sharing of EU Guidelines for Media Literacy with candidate countries, translated to national language, to tackle disinformation and promote digital literacy through education and training (359)*; *asks Member States, in this regard, to consider developing and distributing, within educational institutions, educational materials aimed at different age categories from which both children and young people can learn how to inform themselves properly and how they can check the accuracy of information (360)*; *calls for the creation of an Observatory of foreign influences and their impact on higher education and research; (365)*

CA 13a EPP (422, 423, 810), RE (272)

- 13a. *Highlights the importance of historical remembrance and research on totalitarian regimes, such as on the Soviet regime and a transparent, facts based public debate about its crimes in order to strengthen the resilience of our societies against falsifying and manipulating the history; reiterates the importance of CSOs, such as Memorial, working in the field of historical remembrance, particularly with regards to recent European history, ~~that~~ which is the target of systematic disinformation and revisionism by Russia, aiming to justify its ongoing aggression and interference; (272, 422, 423, 810)*

CA 14 EPP (344, 368, 369)

- 13b. *Requests the Commission to develop an effective Defence of Democracy Package, taking into account the Conference on the Future of Europe unique experience and final proposals, including the initiatives to strengthen our democracy from within, by nurturing a civic culture of democratic engagement and active participation by citizens at all times, also beyond elections; (344, 368, 369)*

CA 15 EPP (372), Greens (371)

14. Underlines the need for public administrations, at all levels, to have specific training aimed at identifying and countering act of information manipulation and interference, ***underlining these trainings should be gender-sensitive (371)***; reiterates the call on ***EU institutions, bodies and agencies (371)*** (EUIBAs) and on national authorities, to continue and strengthen similar training and ***current (372)*** situational awareness actions as hybrid threats are persistent and widespread and increasingly aimed at influencing EU policies and legislation; calls on EUIBAs to set up interinstitutional training to promote the overall resilience of EUIBAs as a whole;

CA 16 EPP (385, 388), S&D (382, 391), RE (379, 383), ECR (386), Greens (380)

16. Reiterates its call on the European External Action Service (EEAS) to enhance its expertise on strategic communication and in public diplomacy, which requires a strengthened mandate and more resources allocated in particular to its Strategic Communication division and its task forces, following the risk-based approach and taking into account the ongoing ***Russia's war of (379)*** aggression ***against (380)*** Ukraine and hybrid warfare ***and propaganda (382)*** coming from ***Russian state and non-state actors***, and its impact to EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans, as well as Moldova ***and other Eastern Partnership countries (379, 383, 385, 386)***; ***stresses that a dialogue with citizens is indispensable for increasing awareness about the EU's foreign and security policy priorities (391)***; ***acknowledges and praises the work on EUvsDisinfo website and database, and calls for further expansion of this platform with appropriate funding; (388)***

CA 17 EPP (390), S&D (387), RE (389)

- 16a. ***Notes the urgent need to step up efforts of countering malign FIMI campaigns aiming to limit EU candidate and potential candidate countries' abilities to align progressively with the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP); (390) welcomes the contribution of the EEAS in supporting institutional capacity and transparency of media ownership, specifically in the Western Balkans, taking into account the fragile security situation and the risk of spill over; (387, 389); underlines the need to proactively counter malign actors' propaganda in the region, which aims to undermine EU interests and values; (387)***

CA 18 EPP (394), S&D (351, 399, 631), RE (395, 396, 398), Greens (397)

17. Calls ***on the EU and Member States (351)*** for ***greater support to (351)*** CSO efforts ***on countering FIMI***, as they have proven effective in raising awareness of the risks associated with information ***and disinformation (394)*** transmitted via social media, in particular, and ***also traditional media, as (395-399)*** many CSOs operate at local level, closer to the targets of disinformation, so know best how to communicate with them; ***believes that technology and media companies should engage with CSOs, who are able to provide expertise on political and cultural contexts, in order to devise strategies to mitigate risks of interference in electoral processes; (631)***

CA 19 EPP (405, 409), RE (406, 408, 482), Greens (404), Left (407)

18. Calls for *sufficient and sustainable (404, 408)* funding to be made available, *in a clear and transparent manner (406, 409, 482)*, to *investigative journalists and (404)* CSOs commensurate with their *efforts (407)* to raise awareness, expose *efforts to interfere in democratic processes (407)* and neutralise *their (407)* impact;

CA 20 EPP (415, 417, 418, 420), S&D (412), RE (356, 413, 414, 419, 421), Greens (416)

19. Calls for the earmarking, boosting and leveraging of public sources for the relevant CSOs, *and also for efforts to increase private funding such as facilitating a conference of donors; calls for* a joint initiative of the EU funds and programmes, *including the upcoming Defence of Democracy package (413, 416, 417)*, financial organisations, bilateral donors and beneficiaries *to be launched*, so as to enhance harmonisation and cooperation in investments for democratic resilience *and countering FIMI (421)*, and that this investment framework should provide *tailor-made (419)* grants, *on the basis of objective, transparent and monitored criteria (415)* for independent fact checkers, *investigative journalists (420)*, academics, think tanks and CSOs engaged in increasing situational awareness (such as researching, investigating, *and attributing* information manipulation and interference, developing cooperation in the field as well as developing *and operationalising the FIMI ISAC methodologies and open-source* tools to tackle the challenge) and include measures to promote media, digital and information literacy, as well as other resilience building activities and support for human rights defenders through annual or bi-annual calls for proposals; *that would cover long-term (356) multi-year funding; (412, 413)*

CA 21 EPP (427), Greens (426, 428), Left (425)

20. Emphasises that it is essential that journalists, *whistle-blowers and other media professionals (426)* are guaranteed the necessary conditions to contribute to an open, free, *impartial (427)* and fair public debate, which is *vital for democracy and (427)* a key aspect of helping society counter disinformation, information manipulation and interference; *emphasises the need for secure equipment and strong, open source, end-to-end encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the communications of journalists and their sources (425, 428);*

CA 22 EPP (430), S&D (432), RE (431, 433, 434), Greens (429)

21. Welcomes the *anti-SLAPP* proposal, composed of a proposal for a Directive and a recommendation, to improve the protection of journalists, human rights defenders and *CSOs (429, 431, 432, 433, 434)* from abusive court proceedings; *(430)* welcomes furthermore the analysis made by the Commission in its 2022 Rule of Law Report of existing threats against the safety of journalists in the EU and legal threats and abusive court proceedings against public participation; *highlights the rise in spyware surveillance of journalists and CSOs in the EU as a means to intimidate and harass; stresses the need to include this aspect in the Commission's assessment on rule of law (429);*

CA 23 EPP (440, 441, 445, 446), S&D (439), RE (435, 436, 444), Greens (443), ECR (438)

22. Recalls that *independent, pluralistic (438, 439, 440, 441 443, 444, 445)*, quality media services are a powerful antidote against FIMI; *recalls in that regard the*

Journalism Trust Initiative, established by Reporters without Borders, which aims at setting industry standards; (435) reiterates its call for a permanent EU news media and magazine programme; (436, 446) considers that media freedom and pluralism must also be protected and promoted on the online environment, in particular as regards the availability of journalistic content on online platforms; (439)

CA 24 EPP (451, 452, 453), RE (437), Greens (448)

23. Welcomes the *Commission's (451)* proposal for a European Media Freedom Act (COM(2022)0457) (EMFA), which aims to *establish a common framework at EU level to guarantee (448)* pluralism and independence in the internal market for media services by laying down specific provisions against political interference in editorial decisions and against surveillance, as well as *ensuring adequate (452, 453)* funding of public *service (453)* media outlets, ~~and~~ the transparency of media ownership, *and for protecting media content online (453); urges that protection measures also be put in place for media and their workers, especially when targeted by foreign powers to undermine the right to information; (437)*

CA 25 EPP (458, 459, 461), Greens (460)

24. Welcomes the proposed creation, within the framework of the EMFA *proposal (460)*, of a new European Board for Media Services composed of national media authorities, which *should (458)* play a significant role in the fight against disinformation, including foreign interference and information manipulation; in particular, one of the proposed tasks of the Board is the coordination of national measures related to the provision of media services by providers established outside of the EU that target audiences in the EU and that may present a risk to public security *(461); recommends that the countries of the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership be included in this context; (459)*

CA 26 EPP (463, 466), RE (449, 464, 468), Greens (462, 465)

25. Welcomes, *in connection with (466)* the EMFA, *the proposals (466)* for independent monitoring of the internal market for media services, which *would include (465)* detailed data and qualitative analysis of the resilience of the Member States' media markets, in particular as regards risks of FIMI; *welcomes the proposal to organise a structured dialogue between platforms and the media sector to monitor platforms' compliance with self-regulatory initiatives; (463) stresses the importance to ensure that the EMFA or any other current or future media or tech legislation does not include special exemptions from horizontal content moderation rules giving a blank check to those who disinform; (449, 462, 464, 468)*

CA 27 EPP (472, 498), S&D (471, 479), RE (449, 467, 469, 473, 475, 477, 480, 483, 764), Greens (476, 478)

26. *Calls for the establishment of "mirror clauses" whereby the openness of the European information space to third countries would be proportionate to the access European medias have in these countries; (469, 472, 480, 483)* encourages the Commission to develop an EU-wide regulatory system to prevent media companies

that are under the editorial control of foreign governments or owned by foreign ~~non-~~democratic **high-risk (473, 475, 476)** countries from acquiring European media companies; this should apply predominantly to non-democratic **or high-risk (473)** countries in which European media organisations are not allowed to operate freely, or are pressured to tilt their coverage in favour of national governments; these efforts should be based on a common database to facilitate harmonised prevention and/or prosecution across the European Union; **suggests that such a regulatory system can be based on existing FDI screening mechanisms to prevent duplications; (471) encourages to include in the EMFA the provisions on media ownership transparency, thus far contained in the Recommendations (449, 467, 477, 478, 479, 498, 764);**

CA 28 EPP (489, 493), S&D (486), RE (487, 492), Greens (491)

27. Underlines that the increase in climate **change (493)** denialism can be linked to a wider embrace of conspiracy theories **in the public discourse (491)**, that **is based in the deliberate creation of a counter reality and the rejection of science (486, 487)**, **which** includes false ideas about everything, from Russia's war **of aggression against (492)** in Ukraine to the COVID-19 vaccines; **emphasises the role of foreign actors in disseminating disinformation about climate change and EU climate policy is undermining public support and is also used in narratives of domestic actors, who use this climate disinformation for their own political goals; (486)**

CA 29 EPP (497), S&D (496), Greens (495)

28. Supports the call made at COP 27 by leading climate experts on tech companies to tackle the growing problem of disinformation, and in particular to accept a universal definition of climate mis/disinformation that encompasses the misrepresentation of scientific evidence and the promotion of false solutions; to commit **to the goal of not publishing (497, 495)** any advertising that include climate mis/disinformation **and greenwashing (496)**; and to share internal research on the spread of climate mis/disinformation **and greenwashing (496)** on their platforms;

CA 30 EPP (501, 502), Greens (500)

29. Calls on platforms to take measures to **enhance transparency and (502) prevent and ban (503)** the placement of advertising promoting climate change denial **and apply them to conspiracy theories and disinformation (501)**; **recognises that there is an urgent need to demonetise the spread of disinformation economy around climate change; (500)**

CA 31 EPP (506), RE (507, 509), Greens (505)

30. **Notes with concern that many of the most high-traction amplifiers of (505) climate change denial and attacks on climate action have (505) 'verified' status across various social media platforms, including Twitter, allowing them to spread mis- (505) and disinformation under this privileged status to millions of followers and that such amplifiers are often based outside of the European Union (505); calls on Twitter to implement stricter checks when selling its 'blue check' marks; (506, 507)**

Platforms

CA 32 EPP (515), S&D (513), RE (512), Greens (514), Left (511)

31. Recalls that the business model of online platforms *still relies on advertising based on personal data and algorithms lacking transparency (514, 515), which means that more engagement translates into more advertising revenue, and that this engagement is generated through algorithms that reward polarized and extreme opinions (511) at the expense of fact-based information and thus (514)* pose significant risks of data manipulation *stresses that the GDPR, the DSA, the Code of Practice on Disinformation and the upcoming Regulation on Transparency and targeting of political advertising create additional safeguards against such abusive and manipulative practices (512); recalls the support for all measures to ban micro-targeting for political advertising, particularly but not limited to those based on sensitive personal data (513);*
- 31a. *Calls on the Commission, Member States and tech companies to work together and to invest more resources in developing regulatory and technological remedies to AI-powered disinformation;*

CA 33 S&D (565), RE (516, 579), Greens (520), Left (553)

32. Regrets that larger platforms, such as Meta, Google, YouTube, TikTok *and Twitter (516)*, are still lagging behind in terms of actively countering disinformation, *even laying off staff despite (520)* constant calls from regulators, civil society and even internally from company staff responsible for integrity; *recalls that platforms must have enough personnel to ensure regular updates of moderation tools in order to prevent harmful content to circumvent their moderation policy, (579); recalls that disinformation and interference campaigns rely strongly on cross-platform coordination of disinformation and micro-targeting; (516) regrets the EU is dependent on non-EU companies to help preserve the integrity of European elections; (553) since the self-regulatory approach of the CoP has fallen short (565), therefore urges all platforms, including smaller ones, to step up their coordination to better identify campaigns and prevent their spread (516);*

CA 35 EPP (401, 526, 529), S&D (524), RE (525)

33. Regrets that social media companies *do not take their full responsibility (525)* and are underperforming when it comes to identifying and taking down misinformation and disinformation on their platforms *more expeditiously (526); laments that this inactivity by online platforms is an expression of a lack of binding rules in the European regulatory framework (524, 401); recalls that the platforms' business model implies that they have access to the relevant data; regrets that they often only act when citizens, researchers or the media flag certain content (525); calls on platforms to prioritise fact-based information coming from reliable sources (529);*

CA 36 RE (370, 531), Greens (535)

34. Calls on platforms to allocate more *qualified staff, (535)* resources and capacity to monitor and moderate harmful content and behaviour in all EU official languages, local languages and dialects, *and encourages platforms to increase funding and better*

integration of accredited third-party fact-checkers in all EU languages (531); underlines the urgent need for addressing harmful content (370);

CA 37 EPP (542), S&D (544), RE (541), Greens (540)

36. *Denounces Twitter's backward steps in the fight against disinformation since its change of ownership (541, 544); in particular, deplores that Twitter has significantly reduced the number of staff responsible for disrupting disinformation, including those responsible for global content moderation, hate speech and online harassment (542); deplores the recent reinstatement of suspended accounts without a proper assessment and the reinstatement of violent right-wing and openly fascists accounts, including those that deny the outcome of the US presidential elections in 2020 (540); strongly repudiates Twitter's decision to stop enforcing its policy against COVID-19 disinformation;*

CA 37a RE (536, 537)

- 36a. *Notes that Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine has highlighted the lack of contact points for authorities to report disinformation and illegal content; (536) deplores that Meta management has often transferred the responsibility [of content moderation] to the security team based in the United States; is concerned by the fact that there are only two representatives for Meta in the Baltics, having insufficient resources to moderate content, which is prone to mistakes that lead to the ban of legitimate accounts; (537)*

CA 38 S&D (547), RE (546, 549), ID (548)

37. *Finds it worrying that health disinformation groups, political extremists, religious fundamentalists (548), such as the Taliban (547) have been able to obtain (549) 'verified' status with a check mark by subscribing to 'Twitter Blue'; calls on Twitter to amend their policy in order to prevent impersonation, falsification or misleading claims of expertise (546);*

CA 39 EPP (539), RE (551), Greens (555)

38. *Recalls that Twitter is a signatory to the strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation, and that a change of ownership should not have an impact on the platform's commitments under the Code; reminds Twitter that the company must abide to all relevant European Union regulations, including the DSA (551); urges the Commission and competent national authorities to ensure that Twitter is respecting EU standards and rules and introduce appropriate sanctions if tech companies are not complying with EU standards (555);*

CA 40 RE (528, 556), Greens (558)

39. *Calls on platforms to facilitate full access, in particular to researchers, (528) to the data underpinning the findings and to keep a repository of take-downs to help researchers in future investigations, as well as to help other tech companies, democratic (558) governments and law enforcement authorities in taking appropriate action; calls on the Commission to ensure this occurs in the framework of the DSA and the Code of Practice on Disinformation and to demand that platforms need to offer a justification why they considered it not to be technically feasible to provide access to data (556);*

CA 41 RE (559, 561), ECR (560)

40. Welcomes the DSA provisions that require VLOPs and VLOSEs to provide information on algorithms, to allow them, to explain how they work, to assess their impact on democratic and electoral processes, and to take risk mitigation measures (560); *calls on the signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation to fully respect their commitments (559); regrets the lack of binding commitments for the signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation (561); calls for a swift adoption of the CoP as a Code of Conduct under the DSA, including audits that would assess compliance as stipulated under Article 28, and for the Commission to consider what new or updates to legislative proposals are required to fill the compliance gap, as well as to provide for the possibility for temporary or permanent suspension of platforms that systematically do not comply with their commitments under the Code (559);*

CA 42 S&D (565), RE (566, 568, 582), Greens (567)

41. Is concerned that some actors whose services contribute significantly to the dissemination of disinformation are not signatories to the code of practice (CoP), such as *Apple, Amazon (565)*, Odysee, Patreon, GoFundMe, and Telegram; *calls on the Commission to encourage remaining relevant stakeholders to sign and fully respect the COP and take part in its Task Force (567); calls for a legal framework to be established in order to ensure a minimum level of commitments to fight disinformation on these services (566, 582); is concerned by the fact that Telegram does not cooperate at all with policy makers in democratic countries; whereas the company has been reluctant to work with CSOs (568);*

CA 43 S&D (571), RE (569, 573), Greens (302, 572)

42. In particular as regards online advertising, **welcomes** the fact that all players in the online advertising ecosystem commit to control and limit the placement of advertising on accounts and websites disseminating disinformation or next to disinformation content, as well as to limit the dissemination of advertising containing disinformation; *including in the context of political advertising (573); highlights, however, that there is no sufficient data available yet to check if the measures taken bear any results (571); regrets that this business model and the recommender algorithm that underpin it remain a crucial enabler for the spread of disinformation and false, misleading and incendiary content (302, 572); is concerned by the willingness of platforms to put the responsibility of limiting the placement of advertising on accounts and websites disseminating disinformation on their users under the pretence of “empowering” them; whereas this responsibility should fall on the platforms, as they have the relevant data and expertise, as long as their actions remain transparent and the data is made available to researchers; is worried by the lack of transparency on the market of brand protection tool against risks related to their image, often relying on algorithm that have proven to mislabel legitimate and trustworthy news outlets (569);*

CA 44 ECR (574, 578)

- 42 a. *Is concerned with the use of footage created using video games to spread disinformation about the Russian invasion in Ukraine and other armed conflicts; calls on the media outlets to be more vigilant towards such content and develop effective means of removing it from their platforms (578); is concerned that Russian-based video and online game companies, including those producing mobile games, are still operating freely on European markets and could be used to spread disinformation and propaganda (574);*

Critical infrastructure and strategic sectors

CA 45 EPP (585), S&D (586), RE (584, 587), Greens (583)

44. Welcomes the recently agreed Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities (CER), the Council's recommendation to strengthen critical infrastructure, and the NIS2 Directive; **welcomes its expansion to cover critical infrastructure in the area of food production, processing and distribution; (585)** believes that recent attacks, such as the sabotage of critical infrastructure and increased cyberattacks show the need to **evaluate existing (587) legislation once implemented in Member States (587)** and calls on the Commission to come forward, **if necessary (587)**, with additional strengthened proposals, **which should include strengthening resilience of civil society organisations working to counter foreign interference and disinformation (583, 584, 586)**; in addition, calls on all Member States to rapidly update their national security strategies and undertake stress tests on their critical infrastructure to identify weak points; reiterates its recommendation to extend the list of critical entities to include digital election infrastructure and education systems;

CA 46 EPP (588, 592), RE (591), Greens (590), ID (589)

45. Is concerned about the EU's dependence on foreign actors and foreign technologies in critical infrastructures and supply chains; points to vulnerabilities created by FDI being used as a geopolitical tool; reiterates its call on the Commission to develop **ambitious binding ICT supply chain security legislation that includes non-technical risk factors, following up on the Council's proposal, and (591)** a stronger regulatory framework to the FDI Screening Regulation¹⁰; believes that the stronger regulatory framework **with guidelines for further harmonisation of national FDI screening practices (590)** should include the prevention of takeover of critical companies in vital sectors or media companies by foreign parties that are under direct or indirect control of high-risk countries **and that the addition of outbound investment should be considered for inclusion under the scope of the instrument (590)**; **calls on Member States to establish ownership transparency registers; (592) believes that the Commission, subject to supervision by the Council, should be able to block [FDIs] that might be detrimental to projects or programmes of, or contrary to, EU interests; (588) underlines that in the Western Balkans these kind of investments could push countries into so-called debt traps, destabilizing further the region; (589)**

CA 47 EPP (554, 599), RE (594, 596), Greens (598, 601)

46. **Notes that despite such FDI screening mechanisms, Chinese companies such as Nuctech have been granted contracts in European critical infrastructures, leading to security risks; (594) [therefore] calls on the Council and the Commission to exclude the use of equipment and software (598) from manufacturers from high-risk countries, particularly China and Russia (599), such as TikTok, ByteDance (598) Huawei, ZTE, Kaspersky, NtechLab (598) Nuctech etc.; calls on vital sectors and other sensitive sectors to exclude the use of hardware and software from high-risk countries that can be used to threaten the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data and services; recalls that any software operating in closed loop remains**

vulnerable when routine checks are made of when it is updated; (596) considers the app TikTok, owned by Chinese conglomerate ByteDance, to be in breach of European data privacy framework, a potential risk and a source of Chinese-backed disinformation; welcomes the decision of the EU institutions to restrict the use of TikTok on corporate devices; recommends to ban TikTok at all levels of national governments and EU institutions; (554, 601)

CA 48 EPP (603), RE (602, 604)

47. Is concerned about the vulnerabilities and increasing attacks on undersea cables and pipelines, pointing in particular to the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in September 2022; believes FDI in undersea cables and pipelines create an additional security risk; welcomes the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EMSA) and asks the Commission to update the European Parliament on the *progress to enhance understanding and resilience of subsea infrastructure protection, improve coordination and information sharing, advance monitoring capabilities together with industry, strengthen response mechanisms, and the embedment of the issue across external action; (602, 603, 604)*

CA 49 S&D (616), RE (612), Greens (607, 608, 611), ECR (615), Left (609)

48. Is concerned about the revelations of how political elites in the EU, for example in Germany, *as well as [with] many other political representatives (611)*, have advanced the agenda of Gazprom and favoured constant support for gas deliveries from Russia; *notes with concern the impact of lobbying efforts on policy-making processes by foreign states and corporate actors with interest in continued production and use of fossil fuels in the EU; (607) recalls in this respect its finding in the previous INGE report (612)*; welcomes the Commission's REPowerEU proposal to transform the EU's energy system, ending its dependence on Russian fossil fuels; *urges EU Member States and the Commission to stop all fossil fuel imports from other autocratic regimes to the EU (608) and moving towards sustainable energy sovereignty; (609)*

- 48a. *Is concerned about the close ties between Hungary and Russia, in which Russia exerts influence through leverage in the Energy Sector; regrets that Hungary has not taken any major steps to reduce its energy dependency on Russia (616)*; believes more needs to be done to ensure open, strategic autonomy in the energy sector; calls for the deployment of renewable energy to be accelerated, *while minimising any further dependency on China (615)*;

CA 50 RE (617, 618), Greens (619)

49. Welcomes the recently proposed *Critical Raw Materials Act (617)*; believes the Act is essential to *secure European supply chains needed to make the European Chips Act a success; (617) emphasizes the need to continue to seek trade agreements with like-minded democracies in securing supply of strategic resources; (618)*

Interference during electoral processes

CA 51 EPP (621, 623)

50. Welcomes the work done by the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations in this regard, especially in preventing and countering prohibited financial transactions from non-EU countries into the EU's political system; ***calls on the Commission and the co-legislators to enhance the Authority's toolbox and to enable the effective tracing of donations to the ultimate payer, thus avoiding circumvention of the prohibition through the use of intermediaries, especially by mandating the Authority to obtain information directly from the donors, from their banking institution as well as by providing a system of push notifications of suspicious transactions from the Financial Intelligence Units in the Member States to the Authority; further calls on the Member States to strengthen legal safeguards preventing that the EU member parties of European political parties receive payments from non-EU origin at national level which are then used as contributions for European political parties and foundations; (621) also welcomes the operational contacts already established by the Authority with competent EU institutions and agencies as well as the Member States, to effectively counter attempts to use personal data for electoral purposes; calls on the Member States to further enhance cooperation with the Authority by making available and operational specialised contact points both in the competent authorities for data protection and for electoral cybersecurity; (623)***

CA 52 EPP (625), RE (632), Greens (626)

51. Welcomes the initiatives taken within the European cooperation network on elections including the joint resilience plans; calls on the Commission to fully involve Parliament **(626)** in the activities of the network as well as the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations (the 'Authority'); considers that similar networks should be established with EU National Parliaments; ***also considers that Member State parliaments and the electoral authorities should do more to inform the public about the risks of interference in national electoral processes; (625) calls on the Commission to draw up a code of good practice on social media applicable to public representatives and authorities, aimed at clarifying and establishing common standards of behaviour, considering sometimes governments and politicians encourage ideological hostility and disinformation; (632)***

CA 53 Left (630)

52. Notes that the European Parliament has laid down a strategy for the 2024 European elections, which includes a special part aiming at preventing and addressing information manipulation ahead of the elections without interfering in the political ***or wider social (630)*** debates, with full respect for the independence of the mandate of the Members; underlines that this strategy should be based on an intensification of the actions already carried out by Parliament, including those undertaken within Parliament's task force on disinformation, and therefore calls for the allocation of additional resources to implement the various actions;

CA 54 S&D (305, 307, 308, 634)

- 52a. ***Stresses the utmost importance to protect the security resilience and reliability of election infrastructure, including IT systems, voting machines and equipment,***

election office networks and practices, voter registration databases, and storage facilities among many others; underlines that information and communication technologies are increasingly prevalent in electoral management and democratic processes; (305) takes note that in order to effectively respond to emerging electoral challenges, electoral management bodies need to adopt new working patterns that enhance their ability to prevent risks and demonstrate resilience, also in a complex digital environment; (306) calls to provide EU state and local governments with a toolkit of services and tools to fight FIMI; (308) notes that when elections take place paper ballots should have a verifiable paper trail, and count with independent audits, which ensure results are accurate; highlights the fundamental role of election observation and independent election monitors; (634)

Covert funding of political activities

CA 55 EPP (637), S&D (638), RE (644, 645, 647)

53. Reiterates its concerns about the regular revelations of massive Russian funding of political parties and politicians *and former politicians and officials (638)* in a number of democratic countries in an attempt to interfere *and gain leverage (638)* in their domestic processes; expresses its concern about Russia's *connections with several political parties and politicians from the EU (638)* and its wide-ranging interference with *the secessionist (638) movements in European territories and in the EU; (644)* [including] in Catalonia [where] *the relevant authorities [are urged] to carry out a comprehensive investigation to fully clarified what happened (637, 645) [and] calls on the European Centre of Excellence for Combating Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) in Helsinki to carry out a study [about this specific] case (647);*

CA 56 EPP (650, 832), S&D (776), RE (648), Greens (649)

54. Takes note that the European cooperation network on elections undertakes a mapping of foreign funding in EU Member States and expresses interest in being informed about these efforts; calls *for the prohibition of foreign funding from non-EU countries (648, 650)*; [calls] on the network to identify common *EU rules on political campaigning and political party financing, also from third countries (649, 832)*, in particular those standards closing the loopholes identified in the first set of recommendations adopted on 9 March 2022 that would apply to national electoral laws in all Member States, including enforcement mechanisms; *calls on the Member States to urgently address the issue of donations from third countries to national political parties, in order to close existing loopholes in their legislation; (776)*

CA 57 S&D (653), RE (652), Greens (654)

55. Takes note of the ongoing legislative negotiations on the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations¹²; expects that these negotiations will *enhance (653)* the mandate of the Authority in particular in ensuring that financial transactions from non-EU countries into the EU's political system are limited, transparent *and subject to strengthened controls (653) and will result in an updated framework, which should strengthen the role of EU political parties in the European democratic sphere as well as curb interference by foreign powers (652); reiterates the need for a balanced and proportionate approach to enable political parties from*

like-minded third countries (652), [including] countries within the Council of Europe (654), provided they have full rights of representation therein, to participate [through] membership and contributions (654), while further enhancing the transparency of funding and decision-making (654) and simultaneously limit the risk of interference by non-democratic foreign entities or high-risk states (652);

CA 58 EPP (660), RE (633, 657, 658, 659), Greens (661)

57. Takes note of the ongoing legislative work on the transparency and targeting of (660) political advertising ; *highlights the importance of [this proposed regulation] that will curb opaque political advertising techniques (657) [and] stresses the need for co-legislators to adopt [it] in due time before the European election in 2024 (633;)* in this regard, recalls its wish to prohibit advertisements bought by actors from outside the EU and the EEA and to guarantee transparency *and non-discrimination (659) including via the appropriate labelling (658)* with regard to the purchasing of online political advertisements by actors from within the EU; underlines the need for the European Political Parties to be able to campaign online *and EU-wide (661)* ahead of the European elections, while limiting the risk of foreign interference;

Cybersecurity and resilience in respect of cyberattacks related to democratic processes

CA 60 EPP (270, 274, 664), S&D (665), Greens (662), Left (663)

58. Is concerned about the serious increase in cyberattacks, in particular to the recent *distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack against (663) the European (664) Parliament's website (663)* on 23 November 2022, *for which responsibility was claimed (270, 274, 663)* by a pro-Kremlin hacker group *and the possible hacking of three Members of Parliament and more than fifty Commission officials with Pegasus software; (662) [therefore] calls for strengthening resilience and protection capabilities of EU institutions in the digital domain, in particular ahead of EU elections; (665)*

CA 61 RE (666, 668)

59. Welcomes the agreement on the NIS2 Directive and believes it addresses issues on coordination between Member States; *calls on Member States to ensure enhanced cooperation and to share best practices in the NIS Cooperation Group, especially on cyber security for elections; (666) asks to consider electoral infrastructure as critical (668)* infrastructure; believes additional legislation is needed to effectively protect *the European ICT (668)* supply chain *security from risky vendors and protect against cyber-enabled (668)* intellectual property theft;

CA 62 RE (669, 670), Green (672)

60. Welcomes the Commission's proposal for new rules to establish common cybersecurity and information security across the EUIBAs; welcomes, in accordance with the ECA special report of March 2022, the creation of a new interinstitutional cybersecurity board, the boosting of cybersecurity capabilities, and the promotion of regular maturity assessments and better cyber-hygiene; stresses the need for efficient, timely and close coordination between the EUIBAs through existing structures, such as the Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU Institutions, bodies and

agencies (CERT-EU) and European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA); believes these structures should be reinforced and that more efficient coordination is needed; ***calls on these bodies, agencies and the Commission to regularly inform Parliament about future conclusions and findings concerning cyber security and information security in the EU (670); calls for a complete cybersecurity audit, to determine whether the EUIBAs have sufficient control over the security of their ICT systems and devices, including a risk, vulnerability and threat assessment, and penetration testing, to be carried out by a leading and verified external third party, when this regulation enters into force and each following year, taking the information security requirements of the institutions into consideration; [believes] the reported risks and vulnerabilities should be mitigated in cybersecurity updates, and the recommendations from the assessment should be implemented through the respective cybersecurity policies; (669)***

CA 63 S&D (677), RE (679), Greens (675), ECR (678), Left (676)

62. Acknowledges that, when it comes to cyberattacks, prevention is necessary but not sufficient; believes accurate responsiveness is key in countering cyberattacks; believes the EU should tackle cyberattacks by considering the following aspects:
- a) the need for increased responsiveness to and resilience against cyberattacks;
 - b) the need for flexibility in critical situations, ***while upholding rule of law and fundamental rights (676);***
 - c) the need for common regulations to ensure efficient coordination, therefore calls on Member States to speed up its implementation of the CER and NIS2 Directives;
 - d) the need to share information between and within Member States, ***in particular with regards to security vulnerabilities, (675)*** while taking into account the need to hide the critical protection level from public information sharing ;
 - e) the need to research and invest in new technologies that would increase cyber resilience; (678)***
 - f) the need to involve actors such as CSOs, private sector and partners in a safe and sustainable way; (679)***
 - g) [therefore] calls for Member States to adopt a more proactive stance and expand their capabilities in cyber space based on the “persistent engagement” and “defend forward” approaches, in close coordination among Member States and in consultation with appropriate EU counterparts; (677)***

The impact of interference on the rights of minorities and other vulnerable groups

CA 64 EPP (682, 683, 687), S&D (680, 685), Greens (686)

- 62a. ***Recalls that foreign interference is often linked to political objectives adverse to the EU and its democratic values, covering up blatant violations of human rights, restricting the rights of women and LGBTIQ+ communities, and fomenting hatred towards minorities, migrants and the most vulnerable people (680);***

63. ***Regrets the political instrumentalisation of the migration issue and its use in interference and disinformation campaigns (682, 683); calls to ensure the efficient management of (682, 686) the EU external border in full compliance with fundamental rights; (685, 686)***

CA 65 EPP (692), S&D (696), RE (699), Greens (698)

64. ***Worries that the LGBTIQ+ community remains target for foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; (699) is concerned about the situation of the LGBTIQ+ community in several Member States, such as Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland (696, 698), and the disinformation spread by state-owned media and far-right organisations on the topic; regrets that disinformation and hate-speech against LGBTIQ+ were the primary motive that lead to the murder of two young people in Slovakia in October 2022; calls to develop long-term programmes supporting local grassroots organisations and citizens' initiatives to help develop the population's resistance to right-wing extremism; (692)***

CA 66 EPP (697), S&D (696, 700), RE (701)

64a. ***Is concerned about the attempts (697) of Russian disinformation aiming at [the] creation of European (697) society's reluctance to accept Ukrainian refugees; (701) calls on EUIBAs and on national authorities to monitor and debunk Russian disinformation regarding the war in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees; (700)***

CA 67 S&D (704), Greens (703)

66. ***Reiterates its call to set up a system for the easy sharing of material in regional and (703) minority languages; welcomes in this regard the Commission's support to the pilot action entitled 'European Language Equality (ELE)'; believes additional measures need to be taken to ensure an effective response to interference targeting minorities; also calls on the EU and Member States to implement accessible fact-checking in order to fight against disinformation and provide access to information in all possible formats for people with disabilities; (704)***

CA 68 S&D (708), RE (711), Greens (710)

67. ***Reiterates the need for targeted action, through a harmonised EU legal framework, against the spread of disinformation and hate speech on issues related to gender, LGBTIQ+ and Roma (711) people, other minorities, immigrants (710) and refugees and people with disabilities (708) as well as religious communities; reiterates its call on the Commission to develop and implement strategies to hinder the financing of individuals, including anti-gender movements (708) and groups that actively spread or participate in information manipulation frequently targeted on LGBTIQ+ people, women rights (708), minorities, refugees, people with disabilities (708) and issues concerning them, in order to divide society;***

CA 69 RE (689, 690), Greens (712), Left (707)

67a. ***Worries that women rights are particularly targeted by disinformation, including health disinformation and foreign interference; (689) calls for a full investigation into the funding sources of gendered disinformation campaigns; (712) reiterates its***

call for the creation of early warning systems through which gendered disinformation campaigns can be reported and identified; (690)

CA 70 EPP (714, 715)

67b. Calls on the Commission and Member States to develop measures to strengthen independent Russian-language media that are easily accessible to Russian-speaking communities; (714) also calls on the Commission and Member States to support independent commentators in order to counter the influence of third-country propaganda on minorities in Europe; (715)

Interference through global actors via elite capture, national diasporas, universities and cultural events

CA 71 EPP (269), S&D (725), RE (729), Greens (720), ID (730), ECR (728), Left (726)

*68. Denounces in the strongest terms the alleged attempts **by foreign countries (720)**, including Qatar **and Morocco (720, 725, 726, 728)** to influence Members, former Members and staff of the European Parliament through acts of corruption, which constitute serious foreign interference in the EU's democratic processes; underlines the need to step up efforts aimed at **enhancing transparency and integrity of EU institutions (720)**, combating corruption, **manipulation (729)** and **influence interference (726)** campaigns; reiterates its call for updated transparency rules **and ethics (720)**, mapping foreign funding for EU-related lobbying, including funding for non-profit organisations and proper regulation and monitoring of friendship groups; **reiterates the need to immediately suspend all work on legislative files relating to Qatar and Morocco, as well as for the access badges of representatives of interests of both countries, until the judicial investigations provide relevant information and clarification and evaluate which dossiers may have been compromised as a result of this foreign interference; (720, 730)***

CA 72 EPP (734), S&D (737, 741), Greens (731)

68a. Welcomes the extension of the term of office and updated mandate for the ING2, special committee and expects the ING2 committee to prepare an impactful report identifying the flaws in the European Parliament's rules on transparency, ethics, integrity and corruption and to make proposals for the reforms to effectively fight corruption and other means used by foreign actors to influence European decision-making processes, considering that any potential enhanced disclosure requirements should be weighed against the need to protect certain vulnerable individuals and groups; (731, 734, 737, 741)

CA 73 S&D (740)

68b. Regrets that the recommendations from the INGE I Report on introducing more stringent transparency rules, mapping of foreign funding for EU-related lobbying, and ensuring an entry, which allows for the identification of funding from foreign governments, have not been implemented yet; (740)

CA 74 EPP (754) RE (753, 755)

69. Recalls the commitments made by the President of the Commission during her State of the Union address regarding the need to update the EU legislative framework for combating corruption; considers that such an update should target in particular the issue of the capture of elites by foreign interests, revolving doors and trafficking in influence in order to prevent foreign agents from interfering the EU political system; invites also the Commission to ***tighten its rules to prevent such capture by autocratic or high-risk governments or entities under their control, to (753)*** deal with the issue of elite capture in the annual rule of law reports; ***recalls the European Parliament's repeated calls for the establishment for a new permanent sanctions regime dedicated to targeting individuals and entities responsible for large-scale corruption; (754, 755);***

CA 75 EPP (765) S&D (763) Greens (762)

70. Takes note of the judgment of 22 November 2022 of the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C-37/20¹³, invalidating a provision of the fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive¹⁴, whereby Member States had to ensure that information on the beneficial ownership of companies be accessible in all cases to any member of the general public; ***stresses that registers of beneficial ownership information are an essential tool for civil society organisations, researchers, investigators and journalists to detect alleged corruption and illicit business interests, and that restricting access to those registers severely limits future monitoring of true ownership by the general public (763); considers that (762)*** such invalidation puts restraints on the work of a wide range of professionals fighting against corruption and money laundering; ***calls on the Commission to find proper ways to ensure that information on the beneficial ownership of companies is accessible to general public (762); calls on the Commission to propose measures under the Anti-Money Laundering Directive with a view to limit the use of cash, thus discouraging the use of illegitimate money and thereby preventing corruption (762); regrets that some Member States have taken the judgement as an impetus to suspend access to the register outright; (763)***

CA 76 RE (767) The Left (769)

71. Is of the opinion that the data on foreign influence through interest representatives at the EU level should be widely available and clearly presented; welcomes the changes introduced by the interinstitutional agreement of 20 May 2021 on a mandatory transparency register¹⁵ in this regard; recommends, however, that a specific foreign influence section be inserted in the EU Transparency Register or that a foreign influence register be established; considers that the EU Transparency Register could include a list of high-risk countries; ***recommends stronger requirements and incentives for foreign powers to register (767); considers enhanced registration and disclosure requirements for CSOs, consultancies, agencies, foundations, think tanks and private companies receiving foreign funding (767, 769);***

CA 77 EPP (779) S&D (778)

72. Calls on the Secretariat of the EU Transparency Register to ban any entities with direct or indirect relations with the Government of Russia pursuant to the Council decision of 3 June 2022 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine¹⁶; ***calls on the same measures to be applied to Belarus (778);***

CA 78 EPP (792, 794) RE (783, 784) Greens (782)

73. Reiterates its concerns about partnerships between universities with Chinese entities, including Confucius Institutes, ***but especially those research facilities related to the Chinese military complex (782)***, and the ***risk they may pose to (782)*** academic freedom and protection of intellectual property; is alarmed at recent findings¹⁷ that a considerable number of European researchers are directly funded by the People's Republic of China with a focus on artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, integrated circuits, space research, research into new materials, neuroscience and biotechnology; ***reiterates its call on Member States authorities and research institutes to review those partnerships, and, where alleged espionage or interference is substantiated, take action to enforce and safeguard European economic and political sovereignty, including through denial of funding or revocation of licences of associated institutes (783); reiterates that academic freedom is a fundamental value of any democratic society (792); urges Member States to make better use of existing mechanisms for the protection of scientific, industrial and technical knowledge, and extending it to the humanities and social sciences; calls for more transparency in the funding of research activities and the financial support they receive (784), notably through the establishment of due diligence procedures to assess whether the foreign funding of projects pose a security threat (794);***

CA 79 S&D (786) Greens (782)

- 73a. ***Underlines the fact that China is trying to combine civilian and military scientific research within the framework of the civil-military integration programme; demands the immediate termination of existing cooperation with research institutions directly funded by or with relations to the Chinese military, with a focus on what scientific knowledge might have gone to the Chinese side; welcomes the publication of the guidelines on tackling R&I foreign interference by the European Commission, but suggests proportionate measures on academic and research institutions, and ensure more transparency in foreign partnerships (782); expresses concern about the Chinese National Intelligence Law, which requires Chinese researchers at Western universities to share their knowledge with the state, and about China's reliance on knowledge spying to achieve its economic and military goals; calls for mandatory commitments to greater diligence and compliance in academic cooperation with Chinese universities and researchers, and for any cooperation with Chinese universities to be subject to a comprehensive security risk assessment (786);***

CA 80 S&D (785, 789), RE (791)

74. Welcomes the publication by the Commission of a toolkit on how to mitigate foreign interference in research and innovation in order to help European universities and research organisations to detect and prevent foreign interferences while maintaining the necessary opening of partnerships; ***calls on the Commission to include academic and research institutions in the Defence of Democracy Package (785);*** calls for the Commission and Member States to further coordinate actions in this field, ***in particular to increase the role of ethics and security officers in higher education institutions (791); calls on the Commission to further develop guidelines for trusted***

research and knowledge security in order to support the integrity of international research collaboration with European organisations (789);

CA 81 EPP (799, 800, 801) S&D (163, 796), RE (797), Greens (793, 798, 924)

75. Expresses concerns about the latest reports about the establishment of Chinese overseas police stations within the EU; calls on *Member States* and *EU* authorities *to investigate the alleged existence of those police stations and* to take coordinated action against *any illegal activities associated to China's United Front Work Department in Europe; reiterates that those stations constitute a threat to national security of the concerned Member States and of the Union in general (797), and should therefore be prohibited (798); calls on Member States to close them down immediately (796); condemns the practice of threatening people living in the European Union, in particular the Chinese diaspora and political dissident groups, as well as the imprisonment of their relatives in China in order to coerce persons living abroad to return to China (163, 796, 924);*

CA 81a RE (802, 803, 804), ID (856)

- 75a. *Denounces signs of Turkish interference and persecution of political activists, opposition leaders and minorities within the EU; (802) condemns Turkey's new Disinformation Law proposal, which poses a threat to the freedom of speech in the country; (803)*
- 75b. *Deplores the dissemination of disinformation and the oppressive use of the internet by the Iranian regime to conceal gross human rights violations, violence against protestors and abuses of power; (856) is worried by the interference of Islamist organisations inspired by foreign states; (804)*

CA 82 EPP (813), S&D (809), RE (808), Greens (807)

76. Is concerned about the growing influence activities of foreign authoritarian state intelligence agencies within the EU, and especially in Brussels; reiterates its call on national authorities to review and update their anti-espionage frameworks; in this regard, *welcomes the Belgian government's announcement to modernize the anti-espionage framework and calls for more INTCEN capacity to carry out its counterintelligence mandate and deepen cooperation with national authorities; (808, 813) calls on immigration authorities to be more vigilant when screening the staff of foreign companies, such as TASS and COSCO, from high-risk countries, when they apply for work visas; furthermore, calls on immigration authorities to enhance coordination to make travel by foreign intelligence officers using false identities more difficult;*

CA 83 S&D (811, 812)

- 76 a. *Expresses concern about a recent New York Times investigation accusing the Russian Imperial Movement, a supremacist group, of having organized a campaign to send letter bombs to prominent Spanish citizens in late 2022, with the help of the GRU, the Russian military intelligence service (811); warns of the risk of espionage in French airports such as Strasbourg, Bordeaux, Brest, Quimper and Toulouse, which use the Chinese equipment company Nuctech, linked to the Chinese regime*

and its military-industrial complex, for baggage screening; underlines that Nuctech is present in 26 of the 27 EU Member States, and recalls that Lithuania, the United States and Canada have banned the company from their public contracts (812);

Deterrence, attribution and collective countermeasures, including sanctions

CA 85 EPP (817, 820, 824), S&D (822), RE (818, 819, 821, 823), Greens (815), ECR (825)

78. Welcomes the EU-wide sanctions and capacity of EU decision-makers to act quickly on *temporarily (815)* restricting the broadcasting of certain propaganda channels following Russia's unjustified and illegal *war of aggression against (815)(825)* Ukraine and underlines the need to ensure consistent implementation *and non-circumvention (815)* of those sanctions; *welcomes the alignment in this regard by certain EU candidate and potential candidate countries (817)*; calls on the Commission to cooperate more closely with Member States on imposing and implementing sanctions; welcomes the General Court's judgment of 27 July 2022 in case T-125/22 RT France¹⁸, in which the Court rejected RT's argument that the prohibition of broadcasting is illegal, and therefore upheld the prohibition of broadcasting content imposed on RT France; calls on the Commission and the Council to include satellite broadcasting in the sanctions packages against Russia, *the GRU affiliated "news agency" InfoRos (821) (822) (823) (824), as stated in its May 2022 resolution (819) and to include all prominent-Kremlin propagandists into EU individual sanctions lists (820); regrets that these channels are still able to spread their narratives under false aliases or through other channels in the European Union (818); especially strongly condemns the opening of an RT (formerly Russia Today) office in Belgrade and the launch of its online news service in Serbian, thus allowing this malign actor to spread its disinformation in the whole region; urges, in this context, the Serbian authorities to align with the Council's decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT (815, 817);*

CA 86 RE (252, 827, 828, 831), Greens (830)

79. Welcomes the Commission's *directive criminalising the violation of Union restrictive measures and calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of the European Public Prosecutor's Office to be tasked with ensuring the consistent and uniform investigation and prosecution of such crimes throughout the EU (827, 828, 830); calls for the EU INTCEN to have more resources to help inform and enforce EU sanctions, and, improve the exchange of forensic information and to coordinate attribution policy more effectively (827);*

79a (new) Expresses its concerns about the rise in the manipulation of automatic identification systems (AIS) to subvert the GPS data and manipulate the position of vessels, allowing certain actors to circumvent sanctions; calls on the Commission to impose stricter AIS security protocols and calls for the inclusion of AIS spoofing technology within the EU dual-use export control regime (831);

CA 87 EPP (836, 840, 844), S&D (838, 843, 846), RE (324, 834, 835, 837, 841, 842, 847), Greens (839), NI (298)

80. Reiterates its call to impose costs on perpetrators of foreign interference on the basis of a strong attribution capacity; takes notes of the ongoing reflection based on the Council Conclusions of June 2022 regarding the preparation of a toolbox, which should complement the EU Hybrid Toolbox and Cyber Toolbox (324) and addresses specifically activities involving FIMI; notes that the FIMI toolbox was expected to be introduced in the autumn of 2022; strongly believes this toolbox should include a specific sanctions regime on FIMI [as well as] **measures to strengthen attribution capacity of European institutions and national governments (834) (838) (839) (840) (841) (842), based on methodologies and framework (847); [these measures should include] presents guidelines for national sanctions against FIMI (837) and be applied by the Member States acting in a coordinated way (836); calls on Member States to discuss the possibility of qualified majority voting when sanctioning high-risk states (835); notes that the added value of the Hybrid Toolbox and [the proposed] FIMI Toolbox, compared to the Cyber Toolbox, will reside in the agreement of norms of responsible state and non-state behaviour that offer an enhanced interpretation of what constitutes a violation of international law principles, such as sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of a Member State (834);**

80a (new) Reiterates the importance of EU's capabilities to defend itself from disinformation attacks and to counteract foreign interference; calls in that regard for sufficient funding and to address possible investment and legislative gaps (843, 846); calls on Member States to update, if necessary, their legal framework so as to introduce a legal basis to penalise foreign interference from high-risk countries; welcomes the introduction of it by Belgium in its draft penal code, which will allow for a better protection of the European institutions on its territory; (844, 298)

80b (new) Calls on Member States and the Commission to consider how to counter disinformation from individual actors inside the EU, such as influencers on social media or politicians promoting disinformation on behalf of high-risk states etc.; highlights the potential needs to develop a sanctions regime against perpetrators engaging in FIMI inside the EU (835);

Neighbourhood, global cooperation, multilateralism

CA 88 EPP (851, 880, 909), ECR (852)

81. Is concerned about attempts by Russia, which have been echoed in *other* communication channels, **mainly including Chinese outlets and in some instances Al Jazeera, (852)** to manipulate the discourse around global food and energy security, blaming the West for the surge in food prices due to its sanctions on Russia; emphasises that these manipulated narratives have gained considerable traction, primarily in the Global South **and in some candidate and potential candidate countries (851)**; recalls that Russia is solely responsible for the disruption of Ukraine's agricultural production and trade as a result of its war of aggression against the country; therefore, calls on the EEAS to take additional measures to counter the dissemination of manipulated narratives in the Global South, spread by Russia and China, including by strengthening the tools and resources of **its StratCom division and (880)** its CSDP/CFSP missions and operations, and through increased

cooperation and coordination with the United States and other like-minded partners; believes the EU should work closely with Ukraine in countering manipulated narratives coming from Russia; therefore calls on the EU institutions to provide support to Ukraine's diplomatic outreach in the Global South; ***calls for closer cooperation with regional organisations from the Global South, such as the African Union and ASEAN, to exchange best practices in countering FIMI; (909)***

CA 89 EPP (857, 917), S&D (358, 885, 887)

- 81a. ***Recalls that many [information manipulation] campaigns and state-sponsored propaganda target countries making strategic choices about their democratic reform processes and pro-European orientation of their countries; (857) underlines the importance of proactive, effective and transparent communication, and calls for closer cooperation on strategic communication with partner organisations and countries to counter FIMI in (887) accession countries and (358) strategically important areas, such as the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries; (887, 917) believes that the EU should engage more with the US in relation to neighbouring countries, in order to build resilient democratic societies; recalls that the stability of these countries is a matter of peace and security; (885)***
- 81b. ***Calls therefore for strategic and proactive measures to counter hybrid threats and to prevent third country interference in the political, electoral and other democratic processes of accession countries; calls to increase resilience against FIMI campaigns and encourage candidate and potential candidate countries to take decisive steps to tackle manipulative disinformation, malign propaganda and other hybrid threats; (358)***

CA 90 S&D (50, 853, 858, 859)

- 81b. ***Regrets the lack of progress made and the continuing slow pace of the Enlargement Process of the Western Balkans, which has led to a decrease in EU support and frustration amongst the Western Balkan population; (859) condemns the continuation of Russian attempts to exert influence over the Western Balkans, which has to be understood to be part of a broader strategy to promote authoritarianism in Europe; further takes note of the pro-Russian message that is spread through Serbian and Hungarian owned media in the Western Balkans; (853) is concerned about recent findings that Serbia is the country most vulnerable to malign foreign influence in the Western Balkans, particularly from Russia and China, and that Serbia still has not implemented sanctions against Russia and has not aligned to the EU's foreign policy; (50, 858)***

CA 91 RE (510, 865)

82. Calls on the Commission in its upcoming evaluation of the General Data Protection Regulation¹ (GDPR) to ***provide clarity if and how the (865) GDPR impacts (865)***

¹ Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119 4.5.2016, p. 1).

data sharing to combat information manipulation *between public, private and academic actors in the EU and (510, 865)* in cooperation with like-minded partners;

CA 92 EPP (873), S&D (872), RE (870), Greens (871)

83. Believes the Global Gateway strategy will be an important geopolitical tool in *intensifying the EU's engagement and relations with partners from the Global South, responding to (871)* Chinese influence, through its Belt and Road Initiative, and of other non-EU countries such as *Russia and (872)* Iran, and build trust with non-EU countries *and bolster trust in candidate countries (873)* to strengthen the image of the EU vis-à-vis Russia and China; *[believes it should be] approached as a geopolitical project that makes strategic investments on the basis of Europe's needs for the digital and green transition, through a strong connection with the Critical Raw Materials Act and Chips Act, and for the Commission to provide clarity on the priorities of the Global Gateway initiative; (870)* believes it is of the utmost importance to act as 'Team Europe' in implementing the strategy, ensure *proper democratic scrutiny, a full involvement of the European Parliament and (872)* coordinated action between all EU institutions, EU Member States and also with the European private sector; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to closely cooperate and coordinate with other connectivity initiatives involving like-minded partners, such as the US, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, to ensure fundamental rights are safeguarded;

CA 93 EPP (878), S&D (311), Greens (850, 879)

84. Strongly supports the work done by the EEAS Strategic Communications and Information Analysis Division and its geographical task forces; believes more attention needs to be paid to outlining the threat landscape *in the context of actors related to Chinese authorities, as well as in the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood and beyond; (850, 879)* welcomes against this background *EEAS' work enhancing capacities of the EU Delegations and CSDP mission and operations to respond to FIMI in close cooperation with international partners; (878)* believes, however, that more resources should be allocated to strengthening their work, both within the EEAS headquarters and in the field; *calls for further capacity building, including tailored training for CSDP personnel, increased knowledge sharing and coordination with other EU missions, operations and delegations, better engagement with local media and society and proactive and reactive communication in local languages; (311, 878)*

CA 94 RE (892), Greens (893)

88. Is concerned about the safeguarding of fundamental rights in the UN process of drafting a Global Convention on Cybercrime; calls on the *Commission and (893)* EEAS to ensure European norms, *rights (893)* and values are upheld in the process, *inter alia by promoting the Budapest Convention as the global standard (892)*; recalls the danger of processes to fight against disinformation being used as a pretext to curb media freedom;

CA 95 S&D (895), NI (867)

88a. *Recalls that all efforts to counter foreign interference should do their utmost to respect CSOs, existing rulings by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as well as the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights, and should not be abused to justify and legitimise restrictive policies, which is a concern that extends to EU Member States as well; (895) calls for criteria to suspend or revoke agreements with third countries to be applied more rigorously, for example in the event of human rights violations, as the current application of those criteria expose the EU to foreign influence; (867)*

CA 96 S&D (898, 902), RE (897, 901), Greens (896)

89. *Condemns (901) the attempts of private military companies (PMCs), such as the Wagner Group and other armed groups, militias and proxies, such as the Kadyrovites (896) and the Night Wolves (902) to influence democratic processes in several countries across the world; condemns recent threat and intimidation messages sent by Wagner to the European Parliament; (898) calls on the Council and Member States to include Russian PMCs on the EU's terrorist list; calls on the EEAS to create an initiative with like-minded partners to counter malign non-state actor groups, such as Wagner; emphasizes that the existing EU toolboxes should include responses, such as sanctions, to non EU-states financing or cooperating with private military companies in vulnerable regions; (897)*

CA 97 EPP (904), RE (905), ID (874, 875)

90. *Highlights the importance of close and continuous cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries', notably (904) Ukraine and other candidate countries (905) in building resilience against hybrid attacks; believes this potential cooperation could take the form of an 'Information Ramstein', mirroring the Ramstein Defence Contact Group, which would bring together media experts from Ukraine, the EU and beyond to discuss the lessons learnt from Ukrainian resilience against Russian information warfare and to develop joint operations; [also] encourages the EU and its Member States to deepen cooperation with Taiwan in countering disinformation campaigns and interference operations; (874, 875)*

CA 98 EPP (906, 908), S&D (311, 387), ID (848)

91. *Calls on the Commission and EEAS to increase cooperation with other like-minded partners on developing mechanisms to address election interference, for example with the electoral authorities of Taiwan, Canada, Australia and Brazil; calls for increased cooperation with NATO in building resilience among EU and NATO Member States; calls for EU Delegations and Member States' embassies in third countries to constantly monitor and map disinformation techniques and actors in the respective countries where they are based, for which they should get the necessary resources, and to help partner countries in developing and strengthening their critical electoral infrastructures, (311) and to set ambitious standards that offer enhanced interpretation of existing international law (848); considers it necessary to carry out updated trainings for EU officials and diplomats concerning FIMI; (311, 906)*

91a. *Reiterates its recommendation to establish regional strategic communication hubs outside the EU, initiated by the EEAS with sufficient funding provided; believes*

that these multi-lingual hubs should strengthen the EU's voice in the priority regions (i.e. (908) Western Balkans (387) Indo-Pacific, MENA, Latin America, and Western and Eastern Africa), improve the outreach to the regional media and rebut foreign sponsored information manipulation and disinformation campaigns targeting EU values and interests; underlines that the activities of the hubs should also provide support to EU Delegations and Member States diplomatic missions, offer synergies with the EU media service providers present in these regions and prioritise engagement with local media and opinion influencers; (908)

CA 99 EPP (381), S&D (310), RE (624, 910, 911), Left (912)

92. Calls on the EEAS *and Member States (912)* to keep working closely with like-minded partners in establishing common norms *of responsible state behaviour (910)* and definitions, and developing tools and legislation to counter foreign information manipulation and interference; *(624)* calls on the EEAS to strengthen *multilateral and multi-stakeholder (910)* cooperation with non-EU countries, *civil society and industry (910)* on countering FIMI through *(381) like-minded partnerships and in [international] diplomatic dialogues and fora (310, 910)* while ensuring the safeguarding of fundamental rights in developing tools to counter FIMI; *regrets that some [EU] Member States still have not filled the vacant national expert positions within the [EU] Hybrid Centre of Excellence (Hybrid CoE); calls on Member States to appoint national representatives and experts to the [Hybrid] CoE; (911)*

CA 101 EPP (918), RE (919), Greens (921), Left (920)

93. Underlines the importance of parliamentary diplomacy and missions to amplify the EU's *debunking efforts and strategic interests, (919) and communicate effectively with (920)* non-EU countries, especially in Africa and the MENA region; underlines the great value of the initiatives taken by *Parliament and its (921)* services in supporting parliamentary democracy in non-EU countries by reinforcing the *democratic functioning of parliaments, (918) parliamentary mediation and (918)* dialogue, observing elections and engaging in debates with civil society;

CA 102 EPP (925), RE (876, 926)

94. Welcomes the support channelled through the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), but believes more action needs to be taken by the EU to support independent journalism in areas influenced by malign foreign actors, such as Russia and China, *as well as strategic support and structural funding for local NGOs, CSOs, fact-checkers and media based outside the EU, including in high-risk countries, enlargement and candidate countries (876, 926)*; therefore, reiterates its call to establish a specific European Democratic Media Fund to support journalism in enlargement and European neighbourhood and candidate countries; *notes that many journalists from Ukraine have come to the EU together with the growing number of war refugees and calls for a tailored support for the Ukrainian media environment, severely harmed by the Russian invasion*; calls on the EEAS to include a parliamentary dimension in its outreach and capacity-building initiatives in EU neighbourhood countries to support CSOs and the independent media;

94a. *Considers that the EU has become a major hub for independent newsrooms from Russia and Belarus, since these countries have eradicated independent media inside their territories; believes that independent media can contribute to countering disinformation spread by the Kremlin and in the long term to shaping Russia as a more democratic country at peace with its neighbours; therefore asks the Commission to develop a long-term structured approach (925) including the establishment of a sufficiently funded policy that would provide long term core support for independent Russian and Belarusian media and journalism in exile;*

Citations

CA 103 EPP (10), S&D (12), Greens (4)

Citation 4 a (new)

— *having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on Suspicions of corruption from Qatar and the broader need for transparency and accountability in the European institutions,*

Recitals

CA 104 S&D (17), RE (19, 20, 23), ECR (18)

B. *whereas the European (17) Parliament is the only directly elected body within the European institutions and (17) is at the forefront of EU political discussions (19) in fighting foreign interference, (17) information manipulation (18) and hybrid threats (17) in our democracies, including in the European institutions; (20) whereas recent events have highlighted that Parliament is a target of diverse and aggressive foreign interference campaigns; (23)*

CA 105 S&D (26), RE (25)

C. *whereas the President of the Commission announced in her September 2022 (26) State of the Union address that a Defence of Democracy package will be presented by the Commission, scheduled for adoption in the second quarter of 2023; whereas this package would include a legislative proposal to protect democracies from third country entities exercising activities in the EU that may impact public opinion and the democratic sphere, a review of actions under the European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) as well as measures on secure and resilient elections, including, among others, cybersecurity measures in electoral processes; (25);*

CA 106 EPP (38), S&D (21), RE (35, 36, 37)

E. *whereas Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine started as a carefully planned and aggressively executed information war followed by a full-scale military invasion on 24 February 2022 (36); whereas Russia uses an array of different methods of interference, embedded in a larger strategy to harm, confuse, frighten,*

*weaken and divide EU Member and neighbourhood States; (21) whereas there were effective ‘pre-bunking’ communication campaigns by the United States and of the United Kingdom prior to the Russian **full-scale (36)** invasion of Ukraine, **involving unprecedented use of available reliable intelligence and making it public to counter the Kremlin narrative and shed light on the lies of the Russian government and related actors; (35) whereas years of (37) ongoing (38) disinformation, cyber-attacks, elite capture and attacks aimed at rewriting history have attempted to prepare the groundwork for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (37) and tried to underpin it; (38)***

CA 107 EPP (42), S&D (43), RE (45), Greens (46), ECR (44)

G. whereas Parliament *is proactively (42, 44, 45, 46)* supporting parliamentary democracy in *a number of (46)* non-EU countries, among others through the actions of the Democracy and Election Support Group (DEG); *whereas the EU’s immediate neighbourhood is particularly important in this regard; (43)*

CA 108 S&D (47, 48, 49, 50, 51)

Ga. *whereas EU accession countries are facing challenges stemming from malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; whereas past developments have shown that non-enlargement has a serious strategic cost; (47) whereas the Western Balkans are an area of strategic and geopolitical competition and some of its countries are prone to destabilisation, threatening the security and stability of our continent; whereas third countries are exploiting these vulnerabilities, including through strategic investments and disinformation campaigns; whereas the stability, security and democratic resilience of the accession countries are inextricably linked to the EU’s own security, stability and democratic resilience; (48)*

Gb. *whereas the aim of those interference campaigns in the Western Balkans is to negatively influence the growing euro-Atlantic orientation and stability of individual countries, and so change the orientation of the region as a whole; (49) whereas Russia uses its influence in Serbia trying to destabilize and interfere in neighbouring sovereign states: in Bosnia via the Republika Srpska, in Montenegro via the country’s pro-Serbian sentiments as well as the Serbian orthodox Church and in Kosovo by exploiting and flaring up existing disputes in the North of Kosovo; whereas Russia therefore still has notable influence in the Western Balkans, with the power to interfere in regional attempts at reconciliation, integration and reform towards democratization; (51)*

CA 109 EPP (57, 59, 60, 62), S&D (55), RE (56), ECR (54), Left (58)

I. whereas a *holistic approach, encompassing our societies as a whole, is needed when educating and training European citizens of all ages (55), including specific trainings for people of working age and in schools (56) to detect and be resilient against prospective disinformation operations and information manipulation (55, 59); whereas a (54) strategy should be established to (55) pre-emptively show internet users videos and content (59) on the tactics behind disinformation, which have the potential to make (60) them more aware and resilient to misinformation and*

disinformation (58, 59), and increase the resilience of vulnerable population groups (57); whereas public awareness and constant dialogue with media is critical in this regard; (56) whereas the central feature of communication success against disinformation is trust in the communicating institutions; (62)

CA 110 EPP (65, 67, 69, 70), RE (63)

J. *whereas civil society organisations (CSOs) play an essential role as watchdogs, are key to building democratic resilience from within and protecting democracy (65), and support the combat (69) against breaches of the rule of law and actively contribute to fostering the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights on the grounds; whereas, specifically, CSOs take important part (69) in detecting and countering foreign interference in democratic processes; (67) whereas CSOs play a critical role in developing autoregulation, enabling the creation of industry standards to fight disinformation, in particular in fields where any state actions may create mistrust; (63) whereas when citizens and civil society participation in democratic processes is further strengthened, then the democracy as a whole is better fortified against the risk of foreign interference; (70)*

CA 111 EPP (73), RE (71), ECR (64, 66, 108)

Ja. *whereas CSOs, think tanks, consulting agencies, foundations and companies themselves are not immune from experiencing such interference or, in some cases (64) can serve as the vehicle, tools (66) and vector of influence from malicious actors (71) and third-party actors to directly sponsoring, instigating foreign interference (64) and influence policy makers; (73) whereas transparency is key to ensure that these actors are not [used as] vessels for foreign interference (71) and therefore clear rules for their influence must be observed and scrutinised; (73) whereas there have been attempts by EU Member States to implement mechanisms to screen foreign governmental funding for CSOs, especially from Russia and China; (108)*

CA 112 EPP (76), RE (75, 77, 353)

L. *whereas, in spite of certain available financial resources, including successful projects from EU funds and programmes, overall, the funding of CSOs and the media (76) is fragmented, project-based and often comes from non-EU countries; whereas application procedure for financing should be transparent and accessible; (75) whereas the Court of Auditors concludes the lack of a coherent EU media literacy strategy that includes tackling disinformation and fragmentation of EU actions dilute the impact of media literacy projects, and that many of those projects did not demonstrate sufficient scale and reach; (77, 353)*

CA 113 EPP (78, 287), S&D (79, 424), RE (80, 82), Left (81)

M. *whereas fact-based journalism (79) plays a key (82) role in a democratic society, upholding the principles of truthfulness, accuracy, impartiality, honesty and independence; (78) whereas freedom of expression and of (81) information are fundamental rights (81) guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and (80) recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, as well as the*

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; (79, 287) whereas the tabloidization of the media has a detrimental effect to reliable public information access and the media landscape; (424)

CA 114 EPP (85), S&D (87), RE (86), Greens (84, 749)

N. whereas *whistleblowers (84)*, journalists, *civil society organisations (86, 87) and activists (84)* and human rights defenders are increasingly facing intimidation, *intrusive surveillance and hacking (84)*, harassment and threats, including legal threats and abusive litigation; *whereas they should be supported by the EU and its institutions; (749)* whereas strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), *including those initiated by authorities from third countries against EU nationals or EU-based entities (84)*, are a serious threat to democracy and fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and information, as *there is a desire and means to prevent or penalise (85)* journalists and activists *as well as broader civil society actors (86, 87)* for speaking up on issues of public interest *and send a chilling effect to all actual or potential critical voices; (84)*

CA 115 EPP (85), RE (83, 88)

Na. *whereas, in the EU, there are cases of journalists whose existence and life are threatened due to researching topics of public interests (85); whereas foreign powers are suspected of interfering in the Union and have extended repressive measures to territories within the Union in order to silence journalists who wish to report and denounce criminal acts; whereas an example of this is the strategy of judicial harassment being exercised by the Kingdom of Morocco against the Spanish journalist Ignacio Cembrero (88); whereas some journalists and human rights defenders that have been granted asylum in the EU are still targeted by persecutions, harassment, violence and assassination attempts; whereas the Member States should ensure their security and that they are able to continue their work; (83)*

CA 116 EPP (90, 91), Left (93)

O. whereas *reducing the effectiveness of malicious information manipulation and in particular its effects on the functioning of democratic processes (93)*, is a matter of public interest; *whereas disinformation decreases the ability of citizens to take informed decisions and to freely participate in democratic processes; whereas this situation is further pronounced with the rapid developments of new types of media; (91) whereas according to The Media Pluralism Monitor 2022 no country is a low risk for the indicator of Media viability, reflecting the existing economic threats to media pluralism; whereas news media operating in smaller markets, including local, regional and niche media, face additional challenge as they have limited revenues, and become less viable using current commercial business models, and cannot embrace new ones in the same way that media operating in larger markets can; whereas, in addition, some Member States, which Russia considers its sphere of influence, are more exposed to geopolitical risks arising from Kremlin's interference in their information space; (90)*

CA 117 EPP (95), S&D (96)

P. whereas the promotion of media independence and pluralism ***and media literacy in tackling disinformation (95)*** is one of the citizens' proposals contained in the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe, published on 9 May 2022, where citizens called specifically for the EU to address threats to media independence through the establishment of EU-wide minimum standards as well as to defend and support free, pluralistic and independent media, to step up the fight against disinformation and foreign interference, and to ensure the protection of journalists; ***whereas the final report of the Conference of the Future of Europe contained also calls for setting up an EU body in charge of addressing and tackling targeted disinformation and interference, enhancing the cooperation of national cybersecurity authorities and legislation and guidelines for online platforms and social media companies to address disinformation vulnerabilities; (96)***

CA 118 EPP (98), S&D (100), RE (99)

Q. whereas the integrity of the internal market for media services may be compromised ***and the polarisation of society fomented (98)*** by media providers that systematically engage in disinformation, including information manipulation and interference state-controlled media service providers financed by certain non-EU countries, ***such as China, Russia and Turkey; (99) whereas a highly concentrated and government controlled media environment can lead to an informational autocracy, where the state or malign foreign actors can easily exert influence with the manipulation of information; (100)***

CA 119 EPP (101, 102), RE (104, 105)

R. whereas China has invested almost 3 billion in European media firms over the last 10 years and without adequate measures from ***the EU and its Member States (104);*** ***whereas*** China's example could be followed by other states with similar authoritarian political ideologies, ***entailing considerable risks for the integrity of European democracies (104), and interference by other countries in the EU's domestic affairs; (102) whereas a number of Chinese state-run Confucius Institutes, that spread propaganda and interfere in academic institutions, are still functioning in the EU (101); whereas Chinese broadcast media represent and disseminate the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology; whereas Chinese bots accounts are increasingly active in social media and social networking serving to the needs of the Chinese authorities; (105)***

CA 120 EPP (107)

S. whereas only some EU Member States have screening mechanisms for foreign media investments in place; ***whereas it is in the public interest to know about the beneficial ownership structure of media outlets (107);***

CA 121 EPP (109, 116), S&D (117), RE (113), Greens (114), Left (111)

T. whereas important structural ***shortcomings (116)*** facilitating information manipulation through online platforms still remain; whereas online platforms business models ***are*** based on ***personal data (114), algorithms that push extreme and divisive content (113),*** and advertising, ***(111)*** whereby more engagement means more

advertising revenue, and engagement rewards *divisive* (113) and extreme opinions at the expense of fact-based information; *whereas online platforms are therefore designed in a way that helps to amplify conspiracy theories and disinformation* (111); *whereas these global online platforms in addition have had a vast disruptive impact on the economic viability of the European media sector, as they dominate the advertising market thus impacting media business models* (109);

Ta. whereas even though the Code of Practice on Disinformation was strengthened many structural problems persist, like the lack of binding rules and the provision whereby companies can choose their own commitments, which ultimately hinders the Code of Practice to be a successful tool; (117)

Tb. whereas there could be potentially grave consequences of the rapidly evolving generative AI technologies, that could enable malicious actors to produce and spread more disinformation content cheaper and at a greater speed; whereas particularly devastating effects could be faced by countries across the world lacking resources to address this challenge;

CA 122 RE (110)

Tc. whereas the Commission proposal on Transparency and targeting of political advertising aims to address these structural problems in the context of political advertising; (110)

CA 123 S&D (55), RE (121, 123), Greens (124), Left (122)

U. whereas platforms have developed several initiatives to counter online disinformation, (55) which designs ‘pre-bunking’ campaigns to inform users about the dangers of disinformation, by pre-emptively warning (122) disproving false claims through *dis-* and (123) misinformation campaigns undertaken by malicious actors (123, 124); *whereas the effect of these initiatives cannot be fully evaluated due to the absence of independent or institutionalised analyses by researchers having full access to data;* (121)

CA 124 RE (126, 532), Greens (125)

V. whereas non-English language content is still substantially left *unmonitored* (126) as *platforms still do not employ a sufficient* (125) number of reviewers and fact-checkers able to perform their respective tasks in other languages, especially in smaller languages in countries gravely affected by ~~pro-Kremlin~~ disinformation; *whereas online platforms should guarantee fundamental rights to citizens, such as freedom of expression and of information;* (532)

CA 125 S&D (130, 133), RE (129), Greens (128)

W. whereas *since the takeover of Twitter by Elon Musk* (128, 129) the company introduced a crisis misinformation policy, according to which the company would take action against tweets that contain false and misleading allegations regarding use of force and weapons, and that it would respond by prioritising tweets from state-affiliated media accounts and place a warning notice that a tweet has violated the company’s crisis misinformation policy, but this approach was partially cancelled on

23 November 2022; *whereas the company has fired all departments responsible for detecting, classifying or responding to disinformation, including a majority of content moderators and country-specific teams and reinstalled (128) over 60,000 accounts, which have previously been found to have broken the platform's rules by sharing disinformation, engage in harassment, abuse and running scams; whereas since the takeover, there has been an increase of abusive content of about 40%; whereas there have been repeated and intolerable suspensions of accounts of journalists and media outlets without concrete justification; (130, 133)*

CA 126 RE (127), ECR (132), Left (131)

Wa. whereas media reports on internal documents have raised questions about the political neutrality of the company's efforts to implement its policies against foreign interference and disinformation in the 2020 US presidential election, and whether those efforts also amount to a form of interference in the political and wider social debate around the election (131), as the dozens of internal emails revealed that methods intended to counter disinformation and hate speech were being used by main parties in the United States to control the electorate (132); whereas it remains unclear how Twitter is going to develop in the near future, due to concerning statements and decisions taken by its new senior management; (127)

CA 127 EPP (140), S&D (137), RE (135, 139), Greens (138)

X. *whereas health dis- and (139) misinformation is a serious threat to public health since it erodes public trust in science (139), public institutions (138), authorities (139) and medical staff, as well as generating hostility towards them (138), and advances conspiracy theories (140); whereas such disinformation can be life threatening when deterring people from seeking medically indicated treatments, including vaccinations, or promoting false treatments (137); whereas, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of COVID-19-related content that was not dealt with after having been fact-checked amounted to 20% in German and Spanish, 47% in French, and 84% in Italian; whereas smaller languages have been even more heavily impacted; (135)*

CA 127a EPP (182), S&D (141)

Y. *whereas networks of bots and fake accounts on social media platforms are used by malicious actors to undermine democratic processes; (182) whereas Meta removed two networks originating in China and in Russia for violating its policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour; whereas the network originating in Russia and composed of over 60 websites impersonated legitimate websites of news organisations in Europe and posted original articles that criticised Ukraine, supported Russia and argued that Western sanctions on Russia would backfire; whereas similar findings were made by EU DisinfoLab in its Doppelgänger investigation; whereas this is only the tip of the iceberg and online platforms have to be constantly vigilant and improving their content moderation policy; (141)*

CA 128 S&D (134, 153), RE (142)

Ya. *whereas there is a lack of oversight over platforms like Reddit and Telegram, where disinformation spreads mostly unchecked; (134) whereas Spotify hosts podcasts containing mis- and disinformation contents, in particular regarding vaccine disinformation; whereas some of them have up to 11 million listeners per episode; whereas the company has refused to take any actions against the accounts that broadcast the podcasts as it has no disinformation policy; (142) whereas the EU started multiple investigations of TikTok, concerning the transfer of EU' citizens data to China and targeted advertising aimed at minors; (153)*

CA 129 RE (143), Greens (144)

Z. *whereas the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force on 16 November 2022 **and will apply from 17 February 2024 (143)**; whereas it fully harmonises the rules applicable to intermediary services in the internal market, and contains specific provisions applicable to very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) when it comes to systemic **risks (144)** such as disinformation and manipulation;*

CA 130 EPP (149), S&D (147), RE (146), Greens (148)

AC. *whereas algorithms **designed to benefit the platforms' business model (148)** play a crucial role in the amplification of false **and misleading (148)** narratives, **creating filter bubbles that limit or distort the information available to individual users; (146) whereas platforms still have not done enough to counter that (147); whereas the development, testing and functioning of algorithms still lack transparency; (146)***

CA 131 S&D (151, 152), ID (518), ECR (150)

ACa. *whereas social media platforms are used as tools (152), for example, to spread Russian propaganda seeking to justify Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine (151), and to foster anti-democratic political movements in the Balkans; (152) whereas Artificial Intelligence, also through the malicious use of large language models (LLM), such as ChatGPT, is becoming an increasingly important tool used to spread propaganda and disinformation, but will also be crucial to more effectively discover and counter manipulated narratives; (150) whereas there is a need to develop digital technologies in respect of human rights and the rule of law; (518)*

CA 132 EPP (155), S&D (156)

AF. *whereas there is a risk of economic dependence, but also espionage and sabotage, with foreign companies acquiring influence over EU critical infrastructure; whereas Chinese shipping **companies have (156)** acquired majority or sizeable interests in over 20 European ports, **(155) such as China Merchants Group in France or COSCO in the ports of Piraeus, Antwerp, Bilbao, Genoa, Hamburg, Rotterdam, Valencia or Zeebrugge (156)**; whereas the INGE I report called for a stronger regulatory and enforcement framework to ensure foreign direct investment (FDI) with a detrimental effect on the EU's security is blocked;*

CA 133 EPP (24, 160, 161, 164)

AG. whereas foreign actors, predominantly China and Russia, but also Iran are actively trying to infiltrate European critical infrastructure and supply chains to steal information and/or know-how through espionage, **(24) in order to gain a competitive advantage (164)**, or to sabotage parts of these infrastructures to impair their functioning; **whereas the same malign behaviour is coupled with economic and infrastructure projects in candidate and potential EU candidate countries; (161) whereas an increasing threat to European citizens also lies in the possibility of espionage and information gathering via everyday household appliances; (160)**

CA 134 EPP (167), S&D (165), Greens (171)

AH. whereas the EU's energy dependence on Russia has created enormous **difficulties (171)** for its energy security after **Russia started its (171)** war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas 'corrosive capital' projects by foreign actors in Member States, such as the Paks Nuclear Power plant in Hungary, risk influencing political decisions; whereas **despite Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of parts of (167)** Ukraine in 2014 **many EU countries increased their gas-dependency from Russia; whereas some of these countries have recently reduced their dependency to almost 0%; (165)**

CA 135 EPP (172) Greens (173)

AI. whereas the investment programmes for 5G deployment such as CEF2 Digital, as well as the 6G Programme of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking, **could (173)** support technological sovereignty and reduce dependencies on foreign suppliers in this field by building secure 5G infrastructure as well as 6G technology capacities; **whereas the development of critical technological infrastructure for the European economy should be reserved for European or like-minded manufacturers and developers (172);**

CA 136 EPP (175, 628), Greens (176)

AK. whereas disinformation and other information manipulation vitiates the public debate around elections and other democratic processes and can prevent citizens from making informed choices **or discourage them from political participation altogether (176); whereas disinformation in political campaigns is a direct threat to fair democratic political competition; (175) whereas these issues present a challenge to the 2024 European elections; (628)**

CA 137 EPP (179, 180, 345), RE (177)

AL. **whereas on the eve of the 2024 European elections increased interference and information manipulation activity is expected; (345)** whereas the European elections **are fundamental to (179)** the functioning of the democratic processes of the European Union, **promote its stability and legitimacy (179)**, and, therefore, the democratic integrity of the Union must be defended, including by preventing **the spread of disinformation and (180)** undue foreign influence over European elections; **whereas the proposal on Transparency and targeting of political advertising could make a contribution by establishing a ban on sponsors of political advertising by third countries; (177)**

CA 138 EPP (178), S&D (181, 183, 184)

- ALa.** *whereas free and fair elections are a cornerstone of democratic countries, and independent and transparent electoral processes are necessary to foster a competitive electoral environment and citizens' trust in election integrity; whereas systemic integrity of electoral processes are also entrenched in the legal and institutional framework to conduct elections, including the electoral management body; whereas the quality of the strength of these frameworks and democratic institutions are essential to electoral integrity of any country (181); whereas online social platforms are increasingly important instruments in the electoral decision-making (178);*
- ALb.** *whereas interferences into electoral processes can occur through different manifestations either direct or indirect, such as fraudulent operations with ballots, blockage of entrance to polling stations or physical coercion to vote, distribution of distorted information on the candidates, manipulations on the change of election dates, and disinformation campaigns on social media, among others (183);*
- ALc.** *whereas authoritarian regimes have become more effective at co-opting or circumventing norms and institutions that support basic liberties, and at providing aid to others who wish to do the same; whereas these regimes have fuelled and exploited polarization, through proxies in third countries and in the EU, and have attempted to distort national politics to promote hatred, violence, and unbridled power; whereas foreign interferences in electoral processes often are not aimed exclusively at influencing specific election results but to undermine and destroy citizens' long-term confidence in the legitimacy of their democratic institutions as well as their democratic processes (184);*

CA 139 EPP (187, 188), RE (159) Greens (185, 190)

- AO.** *whereas third-country (188) funding, in particular from Russia (187) of political activities and politicians inside the European Union before and after February 24, 2022 (185) continues to be revealed by journalists and experts, put at risk the integrity of the democratic functioning of the EU Member States and require thorough investigation to hold those complicit accountable (185); whereas El País has revealed the involvement of the Iranian National Council of Resistance (MKO) in the funding of far-right political movements in the European Union (190); whereas Russia and Iran, together with other countries such as Venezuela, share a common goal of weakening democratic states; (159)*

CA 140 RE (191, 192)

- AP.** *whereas the legislators currently negotiate (191) the proposal on political advertising that complements the DSA, tackles the harmful fragmentation (191) currently existing in this area (191) and will help to strengthen our democracies in Europe and our democratic processes, allow citizens to make an educated decision during an election or referendum (192) through an open process (191) and shelter our citizens from disinformation, fake news, opaque political advertising techniques (192) and foreign interference in general (191); whereas legislators should reach an*

agreement thereon as soon as possible in order to ensure that the new rules will be in place before the European elections in 2024 (191);

CA 141 EPP (194) S&D (193)

AQ. whereas in the first half of 2021 alone, there were as many recorded cyberattacks on EU institutions as in the whole of 2020²; *whereas instances of attacks on EU and national institutions have increased following Russia's aggression in Ukraine (194), as exemplified by a cyberattack that hit the European Parliament during the November 2022 Plenary Session, which shut down the website after a vote on a Resolution to declare Russia a state sponsor of terrorism; (193)*

CA 142 EPP (197), RE (195), Greens (196)

AR. whereas the EU has significantly increased its efforts and investments in cybersecurity capacities, *including (197)* through the EU programmes Horizon Europe and Digital Europe; *whereas there is still a need for more efficient cybersecurity supported by the relevant funding; whereas a strong cybersecurity infrastructure could reduce the costs of cyber-incidents; whereas the Impact Assessment of the Cyber Resilience Act estimates that the initiative could lead to a cost reduction from incidents affecting businesses by roughly 180 to 290 billion euros³ (195); whereas the Commission has been slow to react with measures to the hacking of EU citizens in the EU with spyware by third countries, including on prominent figures such as heads of state or Commissioners; whereas there is currently no action plan in place to prevent the hacking of EU citizens by third countries within the EU (196);*

CA 143 RE (198, 199, 200), Greens (350)

AS. whereas the Council has recently adopted the NIS2 Directive to ensure a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union; whereas the NIS2 Directive has established the EU Cyber Crises Liaison Organisation Network (EU CyCLONe), which will strengthen the resilience of information systems; *whereas a proper level of cybersecurity can only be achieved through the cooperation of multiple actors from the public and the private sectors (198); whereas the EU still faces major dependencies in the field of cybersecurity; (199)*

ASa. *whereas the cyber defence of Ukraine requires the action and the cooperation of all partners; (199) whereas western IT corporations provided assistance to Ukraine in identifying vulnerabilities in its infrastructure; whereas there is a lack of technical capacities within the EU to identify vulnerabilities in its critical infrastructure; (350) whereas cooperation and exchange of information with targeted partners, such as the US, the UK, Ukraine and Taiwan, is key in improving our capacity to attribute attacks (200);*

² <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022SC0066>.

³ *Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment Report accompanying the document "Proposal of a Regulation for the European Parliament and of the Council on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 (SWD(2022) 282 final)*

CA 144 RE (202)

AT. whereas the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking was established in 2021 to enable European actors to shape global 6G standards; whereas collaboration between Commission and Member State authorities on the implementation of the 5G cyber toolbox is ongoing in the framework of the Network and Information Systems (NIS) cooperation group; *whereas the European Court of Auditors concluded that since the 5G toolbox was adopted, progress has been made to reinforce the security of 5G networks with a majority of Member States applying or in the process of applying restrictions on high-risk vendors, but that none of the measures put forward are legally binding, meaning that the Commission has no power to enforce them; (202)*

CA 145 S&D (207), RE (205, 210, 212), Greens (211), ECR (208, 209), ID (206)

AU. whereas *there have been instances of third countries transporting migrants and asylum-seekers to the EU's external border (211)* as part of their *hybrid (212)* foreign interference strategies *to challenge the EU and its Member States (206)*, such as in the autumn of 2021 by Belarus *against Poland, Lithuania and Latvia (209); (205, 208)* whereas these *attempts (211)* also take the form of spreading disinformation, by polarising its societies *and undermining European values and fundamental rights; (207)*

CA 146 S&D (215, 217), RE (216), ID (214)

AV. whereas migrants, minorities and diasporas are frequently *used (215)* by foreign actors, *who orchestrate (215)* disinformation campaigns to exploit and *amplify negative preconceptions about migration to (215)* build up tensions within European societies, such as with the Ukrainian diaspora being the victim of targeted Russian disinformation campaigns; *whereas platforms play a key role in the dissemination of such information; (214)*

CA 146a S&D (217), Greens (712)

AVa. *whereas Europe is seeing a growing number of anti-gender movements, specifically targeting sexual and reproductive health, women's rights and LGBTIQ+ people; whereas such movements proliferate disinformation in order to reverse women's rights and gender equality; (217, 712) whereas these movements have been reported to receive millions of euros in foreign funding, either public or private, including from Russia and the US (217);*

CA 148 EPP (201, 203)

AVb. *whereas Russian disinformation and propaganda campaigns also influence indirect opinion-forming in Europe by focusing on the Russian-speaking diaspora in Europe and neighbouring countries (201);* whereas Member States should play a key-role in making fact-based news sources available for Russian speaking population groups, *in order to counter the pro-Kremlin narrative (203);* *whereas Russian disinformation and propaganda campaigns are also widespread in numerous post-Soviet countries, including in Central Asia (201);*

CA 149 EPP (27, 29), Greens (221)

AW. whereas the Belgian federal prosecutor's office has opened an investigation regarding suspicions of money laundering, corruption and participation in a criminal organisation originating from third countries; whereas several arrests and searches took place from 9 December 2022 onwards, affecting both current and former Members of the European Parliament, as well as staff; ***whereas these allegations need to be followed by effective measures of the European Parliament and EU institutions closing the loopholes for foreign interference, as well as increasing transparency and accountability in order to protect the integrity of the institutions;*** (27, 29, 221)

CA 150 EPP (228), S&D (224, 225, 226)

AWa. whereas trust in Parliament's integrity and the rule of law is paramount for the functioning of European democracy; whereas it is key to ensure that democratic processes are not captured by private and external interests and that citizens' rights are fully respected; (224, 228) whereas the ability of interest and group representatives to influence decision-making in Parliament by way of arguments is a vital part of European democracy; (225)

AWb. whereas the INGE I Report already highlighted [that there is] a serious lack of legally binding rules and enforcement of the EU's lobbying register, and that former high-level European politicians and civil servants are hired or co-opted by foreign authoritarian state-controlled national or private companies; whereas this makes it practically impossible to track lobbying coming from outside the EU; (226)

CA 151 EPP (232), S&D (234), RE (231)

AY. whereas more clarity is needed regarding foreign influence through interest representatives at the EU level, ***especially in cooperation with NGOs, consultancies, foundations, think tanks and private companies; (232) whereas it should not prevent the normal outreach activities of embassies; (231) whereas the number of Russian Embassy staff is decreasing in the rest of Europe, while it keeps rising in Budapest, proving that Hungary is susceptible to Russian intelligence activities; (234)***

CA 152 EPP (236, 237), RE (229)

AYa. whereas lobbying on behalf of foreign interests, especially when it concerns companies in strategic sectors and their governments, may open the door to foreign interference in our institutions; (229) whereas the Transparency Register was significantly strengthened following an Interinstitutional Agreement; (236) whereas strengthening transparency requirements for CSOs, consultancies, foundations, think tanks and private companies could serve the purpose of detecting foreign interference; (237)

CA 153 EPP (238, 240, 713, 780), S&D (239), Greens (241)

AZ. whereas there have been several cases of hostile intimidation and harassment campaigns against Members of the European Parliament orchestrated and coordinated

by foreign countries; *whereas countries like Russia, China and Iran have put entry bans (239) and (241) sanctions on individual Members and bodies of the European Parliament (239, 241) and Member State parliaments, because of their criticism to the respective governments human rights policies; (238, 780)*

AZa. whereas some authoritarian states are falsely accusing European citizens of having committed crimes or offences and are holding them in prison in order to influence the decisions of EU Member States; whereas citizens are currently being held and convicted in Iran without any justification, including the Belgian national Olivier Vandecasteele, the Swedish national Ahmadreza Djalali and seven French nationals; (240, 713)

CA 154 S&D (248), RE (242, 245), Greens (243), ECR (244)

BA. whereas in March 2022 the EU imposed sanctions on the Russian propaganda outlets Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, temporarily (243) suspending their broadcasting activity, as well as ordering internet access providers and search engines to block access and search engines to de-index their content; (243) whereas since the adoption of the 9th package of sanctions (242), satellite operators, such as France's Eutelsat and Luxembourg's SES have ceased (242) to provide broadcasting services in the EU to RT and Sputnik; whereas the offers of Russian Tri kolor and NTV plus continue to be broadcasted by Eutelsat 36B in the Ukrainian territories occupied by (242) Russia; whereas SES continues to broadcast RT News in India, Mexico and South Africa; whereas other national satellite operators, such as Hellas Sat and Hispasat, as well as Hungarian national channels, continue to broadcast sanctioned TV channels; whereas RT France and RT News are still available online (242, 245); whereas Russian propaganda is often amplified by various international media outlets with very wide reach in certain regions of the world (244);

BAa. whereas in clear contradiction to [the EU's imposed] sanctions, Serbia, an EU candidate country (243), has become a safe-haven for some Russian companies looking to evade or weather out sanctions imposed by the EU (248), as the country is hosting since July 2022 multiple (248) RT (formerly Russia Today) offices in Belgrade, and which has launched its online news service in Serbian; (243)

CA 155 EPP (250), RE (267), NI (28)

BB. whereas criminalisation of foreign interference would target and stigmatise this [malign] behaviour; whereas there currently is no general prohibition of foreign interference in the EU, meaning that perpetrators may engage in it without fear of penalty, unless their conducts amounts to an existing offence; (267) whereas pursuant to Article 83 (1) third subparagraph, TFEU, on the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a decision identifying other areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension; (28) whereas there is a need to impose sanctions and place restrictions (250) on perpetrators of foreign interference to prevent future action by them; (250)

CA 156 S&D (255), Greens (253), ECR (254)

BD. whereas the EU has already developed several important pieces of legislation to counter malign foreign information manipulation and interference; whereas there is a ***danger that (253)*** EU regulatory frameworks to combat disinformation ***are copied (254) and might be selectively (253)*** used by other (authoritarian) countries ***in order to curb (254)*** media freedom and freedom of expression; ***whereas the evaluation of effectiveness and impacts of existing instruments on strengthening societal resilience has not been properly undertaken at the EU level; whereas this evaluation would further improve the orientation of future policies and tools to address foreign interferences and hybrid threats; (255)***

CA 157 EPP (266), ID (247, 249)

BDa. whereas, following its economic growth and political expansion on the global stage, China is trying to maximise the diffusion of its propaganda abroad, spreading positive narratives regarding the country while simultaneously attempting to suppress critical voices; (247) whereas China is taking control of all the traditional media information channels in Africa, which is still the most used tool to get information in the continent; (249) whereas Russia is also expanding its disinformation operations in Africa; whereas the Wagner Group is directly involved in those operations; whereas those operations could jeopardise the safety of European citizens and the development of cooperation with African partner states; (266)

CA 158 RE (261)

BG. whereas in discussions with the ING2 Special Committee, ***representative of some (261)*** platforms and other stakeholders have reacted positively to the establishment of global standards, and in particular ***European and, when possible (261)***, transatlantic standards, in countering FIMI; ; ***(260)***

CA 159 EPP (264), RE (34, 265),

BI. ***whereas the Council approved the Strategic Compass in March 2022; (34)*** whereas the Strategic Compass outlines that by 2024 all CSDP/CFSP missions and operations should be equipped with sufficient strategic communications tools and resources to counter FIMI; ***whereas a process of modernization and professionalization in missions communication is required, including supporting initiatives to combat disinformation vulnerabilities; (264) whereas EEAS StratCom has stepped up its cooperation with CSDP missions and operations to help them detect, and analyse and understand FIMI campaigns; (265)***